



VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM

OPAR 2 VIS —Targeting Presentation — Pre D4





D3 Weather Report


- D4.1: Day, clear skies, calm winds from the East (Mission time at event start: 0600G) last clear ATO before 3 cloudy ones
- D4.2: Night, broken clouds, winds from the East
- D5.1: Day, overcast + rain, winds from the East
- D5.2: Night, broken clouds, winds from the South
- D6.1: Day, clear skies, winds from the North
- D6.2: Night, clear skies, winds from the North
- D7.1: Day, broken clouds, winds from the North-East
- D7.2: Night, clear skies, winds from the North-East





D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground

- See Combatflite Summary
- Significant attrition of motorised force that has taken Attaturk Dam. Approx 1 brigade believed destroyed. Assess LIKELY that 1 Bde remains at Birecik Dam and 1 at Attaturk Dam.
- Little effect on 11th Mechanised division at Gaziantep Intl.
- Little effect on 22nd Motorised division south of Hatay.
- No contact with 10th Armoured or 21st Mechanised divisions during D2/3
- VID assess it is likely that mobilisation will be ordered in the next 24 hours. (SYTGT002 in Aleppo – destruction would delay mobilisation by 4-7 days and hamper deployment).







D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground

- Possibility that elements of the 5th Corps are reaching the front:
 - New SA-6 and SA-11 located in the north of IADS Sector East where no units had been previously and where they offer no direct protection to any strategic targets.
 - Armoured Brigade (at least) seen moving east from Gaziantep Int'l by friendly recon
 - Significant numbers of new SA-15 detected IVO Gaziantep Int'l, indicating possibility of additional divisional HQs
 - 5th Corps were reported by VID to be finishing workup in Palmyra prior to D0.

Other explanations are possible, e.g. redeployment of IADS East units from further south and redeployment of 10th DIV (or detatched Bde) eastward to reinforce 11th or 12th DIV. However, with the evidence taken together VIS assess there is an EVEN CHANCE that the 5th Corps have deployed to the front and we seek further indicators:

- 12th DIV continue attack (considered UNLIKELY unless they are reinforced)
- 4 x SA-15 from 10th DIV still in place at Minakh (rules out new SA-15s at Gaziantep being redeployed 10th DIV units)
- 3 Armoured Brigades still present at Minakh (rules out 10th DIV or a detatched Bde having redeployed)
- >1 x SA-8 IVO Attaturk Dam (12th DIV only have one remaining 11th DIV assessed as UNLIKELY to reduce their own protection just before they are attacked)
- motorized units IVO Gaziantep or Minakh (assessed as UNLIKELY that 12th DIV are able to provide significant support to other units having lost ~1 Bde and holding two key areas)
- Mechanised units IVO Attaturk Dam (assessed as UNLIKELY that the 11th DIV would support 12th DIV when they are just about to be attacked)
- Some or all of 2 x SA-11 and 1 x SA-6 located closer to the FLOT (20km to 50km) (doctrinally, army SA-6/11 will protect army HVTs, IADS will protect strategic targets further south.






D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

In Sector West:

- Significant degradation of IADS in this sector, including SCC, SA-2 at Abu-al-Duhur, 1 x SA-3 and 1 x SA-6. This has allowed significant freedom of manoeuvre over recent sorties.
- Still remaining are 1 x SA-2 and 2 x SA-3 in the far south of the sector, plus 2 x SA-11 and 1 x SA-6 (latest intel has 2 in south and one in north of sector).
- SA-3 located at Bassel Al Assad assessed LIKELY to be Russian due to location at their airfield and far from Syrian SA-2s (which, doctrinally, they protect).

In Sector East

- 3 x SA-3 sites degraded (loss of SR) or disabled (loss of SR and TR), plus one SA-11 disabled. SA-2 at Jirah is being redeployed, likely due to airbase there being abandoned. Unclear where this will be moved to, as at Jirah it could protect numerous strategic targets, but MLCOA assessed to be repositioning towards west edge of sector to provide protection to Aleppo and region to SE of it.
- 2 x SA-2, 1 x SA-3, 2 x SA-6 and 1 x SA-11 remain fully operational. Only 1 x SA-2 known for certain. 1 x SA-6 and 1 x SA-11 located in north of sector assessed LIKELY to be army units and not part of IADS, but this requires confirmation.
- In Sector South, no changes. IADS still fully operational.



DISCLAIMER





D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

VIS still recommends on-call SEAD as a minimum (or SEAD organic to package) for strike missions into Syrian territory due to the mobility of SA-6 and SA-11 systems (approx. 30 mins to pack up, a few hours drive within sector, 30 mins to set up – able to reposition within sector between our events).


VID assesses Syrian officials will likely try to increase their effort to produce S2A missiles, esp. for SA-15, due to large numbers used. EVEN CHANCE that 8 x SA-15 will be sent to Air Defence Academy in next 7 days, and LIKELY that SA-15 Bn (4 x SA-15) will be sent to 1^{st} Corps in next 7 days. NB destruction of AD Academy (TGT062) will slow reinforcement of air defence units.





D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - Air

- D3 saw significant attrition of Syrian airforce units in the north of the country, including 6 x MiG-21, 2 x MiG-25 and 12 x MiG-29(!). It is assessed as LIKELY that Abu-al-Duhur and Jirah AB are now abandoned.
- D3 also saw damage to Tabqa AB. Only confirmed BDA is secondary ammo store, which means a reduction in sorties from 84 to 60 per week. Possible damage to fuel stores (but did not appear destroyed) and runways (1 x 500lb, no crater seen).



DISCLAIMER:





D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - Air


- The main airfields of interest currently are
 - Tabqa AB in the east (4 x MiG-29 F/A, 8 x MiG-25 interceptors and 12 x SU-24 bombers remain, all night capable). Destruction of ammo storage not assessed to have a significant impact on effectiveness.
 - Tiyas AB further south (assessed as 22 x MiG-29 fighters and F/A remaining, most night capable) CAP flights observed operating out of here to the north.
 - Hama MAP south of Abu Al-Duhur (12 x MiG-21 interceptors remain) unknown if they've been involved so far.
- VIS assess that it is LIKELY that the MiG-29s assault squadrons will focus on fighter role rather than attack role due to attrition of fighter squadrons.
- VID assesses even chance that Russia will agree to sell MiG-29s to Syria within the next month.





D3 Situation/BDA - Sea

- Significant damage done to Syrian naval forces during D3:
 - 1 Molniya patrol boat sunk, and 2 badly damaged in port (assessed out of action for 4-7 days)
 - 1 Rezny frigate sunk
- Remaining units are:
 - 2 x Molniya patrol boat at sea
 - 2 x Rezny frigate location unknown but based in Tartus



DISCLAIMER





D3 Situation/BDA - Sea

- Syria has now declared embargo on ships/aircraft transiting into Turkey. Main Syrian threats to shipping are:
 - 2 x remaining Molniya patrol boats, and 2 x damaged Molniyas once repaired
 - Bomber/attacker aircraft flying out of Khalkhalah AB and An Nasiriha AB in southern Syria, especially if able to overfly Lebanon
- Shipping embargo supported by Russia, but unclear how they will support. Many options:
 - Russian submarine was observed at Tartus in D0. Could provide covert surveillance or attack.
 - 2 x Neustrashimyy frigate observed at Tartus in D0. Could present significant threat to CJTF shipping.
 - Russian aircraft operate out of Bassel al Assad Intl. As well as direct action, Russian support could include spotting with A-50.
 - Russian aircraft could also operate out of Egypt following deal with Egyptian government
 - Russian aircraft could also overfly Iran/Iraq to strike JCTF vessels directly from Russian airbases.
- VID assesses LIKELY that Iran will give Hezbollah Silkworm missiles which could threaten CJTF or Israeli shipping. Range is 55 nautical miles if targeting information is fed from Russian A-50.





D3 Situation/BDA - Sea

- VIS recommends that JCTF shipping is routed to stay at least 55
 nautical miles from the Lebanese coast to stay out of Silkworm range
 and give more time to respond to air threats.
- If logistics security becomes a priority, VIS recommends that Syrian naval capability to interdict JCTF shipping be neutralized. This will also make it clearer if Russia is directly supporting the embargo with strikes from Russian vessels/aircraft, which could itself have a deterrent effect against such attacks. To do this, VIS recommends targeting the Molniyas and Reznys directly. This is unlikely to be a high priority until further supply ships are expected.





D3 Enemy Situation/BDA - WMDs


- No new intel on WMDs.
- This is a significant intelligence gap, and VIS recommends urgent deployment of SOF teams to observe TGT003 and TGT137 for signs of activity.
- INTREP .cf produced to assist planning strike if needed: currently fuel/oxidiser infrastructure looks like the critical vulnerability of the WMD system.





D4 Enemy MLCOA

- ML COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - VIS assess that Syria will continue to re-affirm itself as strong and aggressive by:
 - Consolidating current position:
 - 11th DIV defends positions IVO Gaziantep. Extensive use of rocket artillery against 56th DIV to disrupt CJTF ability to attack.
 - 10th DIV counter-attacks once 11th is attacked. Potential for spoiling attack to gain initiative.
 - 2nd Corps maintain defensive positions near Hatay to protect flank.
 - Extend territorial gains to the northeast:
 - 12th Mot DIV, reinforced by detached Bde from 10th Armour DIV, continue attack on Turkish forces, pinning forces in Sanliurfa city and attacking Sanliurfa airfield to isolate Turkish forces in the region. Later, continue NE to seize further key terrain (e.g. crossing at Gumuskasik and ultimately Ergani/Maden), allowing the annexation of a significant portion of SE Anatolia region.
 - Exploiting JCTF mis-steps, e.g. losses, adverse effects on civilians, breaking ROI etc. for domestic propaganda purposes and to encourage diplomatic pressure on JCTF.
 - Arrival of 5th Corps elements would make the latter goal significantly easier and more likely to happen sooner, giving them the opportunity to attack in strength along a new axis from the south as well as increasing forces in the area.



DISCLAIMER:





D4 Enemy MLCOA


- ML COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - Signs of pending invasion of Syrian territory (e.g. close to Hatay) likely to result in threats to use WMDs on CJTF forces and/or Turkish civilian targets.
 - Reconfiguration of IADS to maximise cover on key WMD infrastructure.
 - Airforce Assault Sqns deployed chiefly in A2A role to replace losses. CAP out of Tiyas AB, Tabqa AB and Hama AB.
 - Navy aims to enforce embargo, with Molniyas and Reznys aiming to stay within IADS coverage except when intelligence received about JTCF logistics shipping.
 - Syria have motivation for Russia to become more involved in the conflict and will likely look for opportunities to exploit ambiguity and potential for confusion. Russia can provide indirect support to their ally by creating ambiguous situations that make use of JCTF reluctance for conflict with Russia to escalate. VIS assess it is LIKELY that Russia will increase activity in the region even if not providing direct support in the form of attacks on JCTF forces or shipping: more flights from Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and increased naval activity.





D4 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - 11th DIV defends Gaziantep Intl, using heavy rocket arty to strike at CJTF FARPs and other targets. 10th DIV detaches a brigade with SA-15s to suppress CJTF CAS during the 56th DIV attack.
 - 2nd Corps launch attack on Hatay with support from a second brigade of the 10th DIV with the aim of ultimately driving far enough north to endanger Incirlik AB (VIS assess as UNLIKELY without further reinforcement from 5th Corps).
 - 10th DIV holds the third brigade in reserve ready for a counterattack on the 56th DIV.
 - If 5th Corps arrives:
 - Attack on Hatay becomes more feasible
 - Further deployment of SAM units to provide cover against CAS for 56th DIV
 - Possibility of simultaneous attacks further northeast







D4 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
 - Mobilisation declared, allowing Syrian army to plan more aggressively as they will receive further reinforcement in the near future
 - IADS units redeployed north to provide greater defence in depth and prevent easy CJTF access to strategic targets, as well as improving their air-force's prospects providing effective CAP.
 - Airforce redeploys fighter/interceptor squadrons further north to alternative airfields within IADS coverage, and spreads night-capable squadrons more evenly to avoid reliance on particular airfields.
 - SCUD regiments moved to alert state 3, deploy to hiding places and used to attack Incirlik and other targets, disrupting ability of CJTF to project air power
 - Syrian navy exploits Russian support for embargo and absence of CJTF SAG to attack CSG with Molinyas, with Reznys providing support.
 - Syria conducts cyber-attacks on CJTF assets, causing further disruption to logistics





D4 Current TST List

- VIS recommend that SCUDs stay on the TST list at this point. No other target would be worth deviating from the planned mission to engage.
- Molniyas within 70NM of CSG?
- Syrian bomber flight flying toward Incirlik?





D3 Intelligence Requirements

- Full list provided in separate Excel sheet.
- Many new ones for D4, chiefly focusing around:
 - Potential arrival of 5th Corps
 - Status and disposition of Scuds
 - Syrian/Russian ability to enforce embargo
- Scud status considered PIR, and VIS requests SOF teams inserted to observe TGT003 and TGT137 as this requires more continuous surveillance than most other IRs.

			And the name in ing 2 Deany Frigates still in next at Tantara	
IR19			Are the remaining 2 Rezny Frigates still in port at Tartus? (2 seen there D0, 1 sunk D3.1)	D4.1
IR20			Where is the remaining Molniya patrol boat? (2 damaged in port D3.1, 1 sunk D3.1, 1 heading south from Latakia D3.1)	D4.1
IR21			Are the Russian vessels still in port at Tartus (2 x Neustrashimyy frigate, 1 x submarine)	D4.1
IR22			Is Abu al Duhur abandoned?	D4.1
IR23			Confirm Jirah AB is abandoned	D4.1
IR24			Has the 5th Corps arrived at the front line from Palmyra?	D4.1
	IR24.1		Is the 12th Mot DIV continuing attack NW or NE?	D4.1
	IR24.2		Are the 4 x SA-15 from 10th Armour DIV still at Minakh?	D4.1
	IR24.3		Are there still 3 armoured bridgades IVO Minakh?	D4.1
	IR24.4		Is there more than 1 x SA-8 IVO Attaturk Dam?	D4.1
	IR24.5		Are there motorised units IVO Minakh or Gaziantep?	D4.1
	IR24.6		Are there Mechanised units IVO Attaturk Dam?	D4.1
	IR24.7		Are some or all of 2 x SA-11 and 1 x SA-6 located within approx 50km of the FLOT, away from strategic targets?	D4.1
IR25			Is the SA-6 in the north of IADS Sector East part of the IADS or army? (see IR24.7)	D4.1
IR26			Is the SA-11 in the north of IADS Sector East part of the IADS or army? (see IR24.7)	D4.1
IR27			Has the 10th DIV moved from Minakh, or detatched a brigade? (see IR24.2, IR24.3)	D4.1
IR28			Where is the SA-2 previously at Jirah AB being moved to?	D4.1
IR29			Are the SA-3s supporting SA-2 previously at Jirah AB also moving?	D4.1
IR30			Have Silkworm missiles arrived at Lebanon?	D4.1
IR31			What is the status and disposition of Syrian Scud units and readiness for conducting WMD attacks?	D4.1
	IR31.1		What is the status of units at the Scud regimental base in Aleppo?	D4.1
	IR31.2		Is there any activity at the Rocket Fuel Factory in Aleppo?	D4.1
IR32		VID_IR_6	What Russian forces are present at Tartus or Bassel Al- Assad?	D4.1
	IR32.1		What Russian forces are present at Tartus?	D4.1
	IR32.2		What Russian forces are present at Bassel Al-Assad?	D4.1
IR33		VID_IR_8	Are Russian aircraft operating out of Egypt? What and how?	D4.1
IR34			Is there a backup SCC in the Western IADS sector?	D4.1





D4 Targeting Recommendations

- Target the Army SAMs SA-15, SA-6 and SA-11, to create a permissive environment for CAS/AR missions, esp. IVO Gaziantep
- Heavy rocket arty and rocket arty from 1st and 2nd Corps units, esp. IVO Gaziantep
- Continue to degrade IADS to allow strategic targets to be hit more easily and provide more permissive environment for CAP to operate. Specifically:
 - Destroy SA-6 that has deployed to protect Aleppo so we can continue to hold critical WMD targets vulnerable
 - Mop up further SA-11 and SA-6 sites further south to open up space toward strategic targets in Hama and Homs
 - Looking beyond D4, target IADS sector East SSC, and TGT062 (Air defence academy IVO Homs, a critical node in deploying new air defence units to replace losses)
- No known inbound logistics shipping for D4, but later may need to prioritize disabling Syrian naval vessels